

# *Complex Operations: The Civ-Mil Dilemma*



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Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE <b>OCT 2010</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-2010 to 00-00-2010</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Complex Operations: The Civ-Mil Dilemma</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>National Defense University, Center for Complex Operations, Washington, DC, 20319-5066</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES <b>Social Science Underpinnings of Complex Operations 18-21 October 2010; George Mason University, Arlington Campus.</b>					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>Same as Report (SAR)</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>31</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

# Center for Complex Operations

- Congress Authorized the creation of the CCO in the FY09 NDAA (Sec. 1031) for the following purposes:
  - ❑ Provide for effective coordination in the preparation of DoD and other United States Government personnel for complex operations.
  - ❑ Foster unity of effort among the departments and agencies of the USG, foreign governments and militaries, IOs, and NGOs.
  - ❑ Conduct research; collect, analyze, and distribute lessons learned; and compile best practices in matters relating to complex operations.
  - ❑ Identify gaps in the T&E of DoD and other USG personnel relating to complex operations, and facilitate efforts to fill such gaps.

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*“Everyone knows the answers;  
they just don’t know the questions.”*

## *The Answers*

- Non-military means are primary in complex operations.
- The role of military forces is to afford sufficient protection and stability for civilian agencies to operate.
- Civil operations and activities are non-traditional military missions.
- Civilian agencies must lead and conduct political, economic, and social programs in complex operations.
- Civilian agencies must be provided more funding and resources to build institutional capabilities and capacities.

## *The Problem*

- We have a set of convictions about civilian and military roles and missions in complex operations- are they accurate?
- Our military currently is perceived to be conducting “non-traditional missions”- what does that mean?
- We seek to build civilian agency capacities and create ‘whole-of-government’ capabilities- to do what?

## *“Complex Operations” Defined*

- A stability operation;
- A security operation;
- A transition and reconstruction operation;
- A counterinsurgency operation;
- An operation consisting of irregular warfare.

*Source: NDAA09; Sec. 1031*



## *By Another Name....*

- Small Wars
- Irregular Warfare
- Unconventional Warfare
- Asymmetric Warfare
- Low Intensity Conflict
- (M)OOTW
- Peace Operations
- Complex Operations
- Countering Irregular Threats
- Counterinsurgency
- Stability Operations
- Nation-Building
- Reconstruction Operations
- Foreign Internal Defense
- Opposed Development

## *Strategic Tasks*

Restore and Maintain Security

Conduct Reconstruction

Promote Effective Governance

Sustain Economic Development

Support Reconciliation

Foster Social Change

# *How did we get here?*



## *Statutory Roles- 19<sup>th</sup> Century*

- Department of State
  - ❑ Formulates and implements foreign policy
  - ❑ Represents the US Government to foreign states
  - ❑ Negotiates treaties and agreements
  
- Departments of War and Navy
  - ❑ Fight wars and conducts expeditions
  - ❑ Protect or enforces American interests
  - ❑ Temporarily occupy conquered territories
  - ❑ Serve as US federal constabulary forces
  
- Department of the Interior
  - ❑ Administers US territories in the continental United States



# *The Philippines*

- 1899-1902: Philippine Insurrection
  - ❑ Military, as occupation force, performed all civil and military tasks
  - ❑ Military governors of provinces
  - ❑ War Department Bureau of Insular Affairs established
- 1902-1941: Colonial Administration
  - ❑ Civilian Governor General reported to Secretary of War
  - ❑ Army officers administered provinces still in conflict
  - ❑ Civilians briefly oversaw 'pacified' provinces
  - ❑ Civilian experts and private citizens operated within structure
  - ❑ Beginning in 1913, Philippines became self-governing




# *The 'Banana Wars'*

- 1915-1934: Haiti, Santo Domingo, Nicaragua
  - US Ambassador provided policy guidance and overall command
  - Marines performed virtually all tasks
    - Marine brigade conducted stabilization and security operations
    - Marine officers/NCOs seconded to Gendarme and civil services
- 1906-1921: Cuba
  - Army assumed control of Cuba; returned power to Cuban government
    - Restored order, reestablished governance
    - Army officers governed provinces for short periods and filled most government positions during transition
- Few USG civilians deployed
- “Host” government slowly returned to power



# US “Small Wars”




## Military Transitions to Indigenous Authorities



# *European Imperial Policing*

## ■ British Colonial Model

- Single Governor General had authority over military and colonial service
  - British filled most senior administrative positions and officered security forces
  - British Army garrisons provided reserve in event of conflict, built infrastructure (“Military Support to Civil Authorities”)
  - Responses to uprisings largely punitive in nature
- Colonial policy relied on co-opting local tribes and leaders
- Much of British empire was self-governing




## ■ French Colonial Model

- Single Governor General commanded military and colonial service
  - French filled majority of administrative positions and officered security forces
  - French Colonial Army maintained internal security; fought uprisings
  - Responses to uprisings largely punitive in nature
  - Little attempt to build indigenous capabilities
- French empire was not self-governing



# *Imperial Policing*



## **Military Transitions to Colonial Administrators**

# *World War II: US Military Governance*

- Military assumed full responsibility for occupied and liberated territories
- Specially trained units planned for and deployed specifically to conduct civil operations
  - Relieved combat units of civil affairs tasks
  - Task organized to conduct operations
- Transitioned to local authorities
- Army and Navy carried out occupations into the 1950s
  - All tasks carried out by military
  - Civilians provided expertise
  - Aid agencies worked within military structures
  - Marshall Plan was not used to reconstruct occupied areas



# *Post-Colonial Counterinsurgency*

## ■ British in Malaya

- Single High Commissioner commanded civil-military efforts
- British were the government
  - All security forces under British command
  - Political structures led by British authorities
  - Indigenous forces and capabilities adjuncts to British
- Goal- Restore British authority, then transition to indigenous authorities

## ■ US in Vietnam

- No single strategic authority
  - Invariably operated through a “host” government
  - Did not control indigenous security forces or political structures
  - Ambassador nominally in control, but military commanders operated within military hierarchy
- Goal- Restore “host” nation authority and reform it in the process



# *Civil Operations and Rural Development Support*

- The CORDS Program
  - ❑ Formed in May 1967 to coordinate U.S. civil and military pacification
  - ❑ Single chain from strategic to tactical levels for civ-mil programs
  - ❑ Responsible for “local military aspects of pacification and the civilian aspect of pacification”
  - ❑ Competing priorities- attacking the enemy or building civil society (CORDS and Phoenix)
- The Command Structure
  - ❑ Deputy for CORDS reported directly to COMUSMACV
  - ❑ Integrated civilian and military staffs at province and district levels
  - ❑ CORDS and military efforts distinct, but coordinated
- The Numbers (ca. 1969-70)
  - ❑ 6361 Military; 948 Civilian; 188 Third Country
  - ❑ At district level, a total of 96 civilians (232 districts)
  - ❑ US Army MAT: 1985; USMC CAP: ~2000
  - ❑ Funding: \$729M from DoD; \$48M from USAID; \$114 from ‘Counterparts’



# *Cold War: Manage the Problem*

- USSR in Eastern Europe
  - ❑ Poland (1953), Hungary (1956). and Czechoslovakia (1968)
  - ❑ The military intervened to end unrest and rebellion
  - ❑ Opposition was eliminated and Communist Party reinforced
- US and UK Interventions
  - ❑ Lebanon (1958); Jordan (1958); Laos (1962); DomRep (1965); Grenada (1983)
  - ❑ Rapid operations to restore order and reestablish friendly government
  - ❑ Military withdrew and returned power to “host” government
  - ❑ Goal: Prevent or stop Communist incursions



## ■ **Panama**

- ❑ Military overthrew government; neutralized security forces
- ❑ Military conducted post-conflict reconstruction; transitioned to Panamanian authorities

## ■ **Peacekeeping: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo**


- ❑ Military ended violence and established security
- ❑ US military forces transitioned to the UN or other international forces
- ❑ Peacekeeping/enforcement operations continue for years
- ❑ Civil functions carried out under UN



## ■ **Iraq and Afghanistan**

- ❑ Military planned to conduct CT and counter-insurgent military operations and set stable conditions for civilian development
- ❑ Reality on the ground prevented military to civilian transition
- ❑ Military assumed civilian tasks
- ❑ PRTs formed to conduct civil tasks and provide expertise in support of military operations.
- ❑ USG continues to grapple with civ-mil integration

# *Patterns of Violence*



Presumed Pattern of Violence  
Historical Pattern of Violence


## *Current Presumptions*

- Complex operations require civilian capacities, with the military in support.
- The transition is from military forces to US or international civil agencies.
- Once the security situation allows, military forces withdraw, retaining only a limited security and training capability.
- Civil agencies transition governance and development to indigenous institutions as they become capable of assuming them.

**Given Past and Current Operations, Are These Valid?**




## *The Concept Today*



### **Military Transitions to US/ International Civil Authority**

## *The Wild Card....*




**Military Transitions to US/ International Civil Authority**

## *US Historical Reality*

- Military forces conducted the full spectrum of civ-mil tasks; advised and supported by civilian expertise.
- The transition was from military forces to indigenous institutions, not to US or other civilian agencies.
- Civilians provided policy guidance and expertise, first to military forces, then to indigenous institutions.
- The US has rarely fielded a robust civilian capability for administering or governing other states or regions; and likely will not for many years, if at all.
- The US has rejected establishing a large civilian capability for administering foreign lands; it smacks of imperialism.

# *The US Historical Reality*



## **Military Transitions to Indigenous Authorities**

## *The Civ-Mil Dilemma*

- Military and civil tasks cannot be separated; especially in conflict and post-conflict situations
- US civil agencies have not “traditionally” carried out civil tasks; they provide policy guidance and expertise, but not the execution.
- Security concerns and scope of effort often preclude large-scale civilian presence.
- US institutional traditions largely prohibits development of a robust civilian capacity to administer other countries.
- US ‘Interagency’ provides guidance, advice, and funding to other non-US agencies, but they have not replaced military forces.

The question is not one of roles and missions, it is one of mil-civ transition. This fundamental strategic and conceptual dilemma has not been addressed.

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“These programs lead some to claim there has been a militarization of civilian foreign aid. If I could re-define the issue somewhat, the underlying issue may be more the ‘civilianization’ of the battlefield... DOD is not taking over State and USAID's functions. Instead, State and USAID have been tasked with the responsibility to manage what were once traditional DoD functions. “

Philip L. Christenson  
Former Assistant Administrator, USAID  
March 18, 2009  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs



He's so  
full of it!

Dude!!



**It all depends on  
how you see it!**